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1 Introduction
Stock options play a key role in an employee’s compensation contract while simultaneously
shaping a firm’s payout policy. In this context, share repurchases are crucial to fulfilling option
exercises and avoiding stock and earnings dilution. However, the literature does not elaborate
on how this link is established over the various characteristics (exercisability and moneyness)
of stock options. Understanding this is significant to determining not just the cost implications
of funding stock options, but also the prevalence of inherent share repurchase flexibility. The
aim of our research is to fill this gap by addressing how firms use share repurchases to fund
their stock option commitments.
The presence of stock options in compensation plans is often cited as a reason for the pop-
ularity of share repurchases in payout policy (Dittmar, 2000; Fenn and Liang, 2001), primarily
because of the ability of share repurchases to manage the dilutive effect of stock options on
existing shares outstanding. Early studies of Jolls (1998) and Weisbenner (2000) found that
firms are more likely to announce repurchase programs as the levels of option grants to em-
ployees increase. While firms could issue new stock through a seasoned equity offering (SEO)
(as an alternative to repurchasing existing stock from the market), it would consequently mean
firms shouldering the dilutive cost of the new stock issue, while also raising the monetary and
signalling cost (Eckbo et al., 2007). Repurchase, on the other hand, is anti-dilutive to earnings
(Bens et al., 2003), and its non-commital feature enables firms to manage how they repurchase
shares by varying transaction frequency, volume and/or value. These detailed measures of how
a firm repurchases its shares allow an assessment of the role of payout in option funding under
changing conditions of option exercisability and moneyness. Hence, we considered repurchase
flexibility as the ability of a firm to dynamically alter its behaviour, measured through repur-
chase frequency, volume and value. This allows us to broaden the option funding hypothesis
of Fenn and Liang (2001) and Kahle (2002) who demonstrate the influence of aggregate levels
of managerial stock options on aggregate number of shares repurchased by a firm.
This broader assessment of the option funding hypothesis using detailed measures of re-
purchase flexibility has previously been constrained either by a lack of granular repurchase
data, or considerations of repurchase programmes only. Fine details associated with repur-
chase implementation and option vesting characteristics are lost in aggregation, thus mak-
ing it hard to establish repurchase implementation behaviour around specific option exercise
dates. These limits are visible in research by Ben-Rephael et al. (2014) and Dittmar and Field
(2015) who use quarterly disclosures of monthly repurchases but lack detail on frequency and
repurchase size. Additionally, merely announcing repurchase programmes does not guarantee
implementation of repurchases, which consequently also fails to guarantee option funding un-
less implemented. Our study overcomes these data concerns by hand-collecting a sample of
daily repurchase transactions by U.K. firms from 1998 to 2010. For this sample, we aggre-
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gate director-level information on exercisability and moneyness of stock option plans so as to
precisely determine the significance of option funding in share repurchases.
A second issue we address in our study concerns the recognition of cost in funding op-
tion grants. Kahle (2002) and Fenn and Liang (2001) established the link between option
exercisability and repurchase program announcements, while implying that firms announce
repurchase programmes when options are most likely to be exercised and are in-the-money.
This view of the option funding hypothesis implies that options are funded at prices close to
those at which they are likely to be exercised. Funding options while they are near exercisabil-
ity not only limits the underlying repurchase flexibility as they become more predictable, but
also raises the cost to shareholders (i.e., the difference between repurchase and option strike
price). This is in contrast to ample evidence in the literature showing that firms time their
repurchases when the implied repurchase cost is lower (Dittmar and Field, 2015; Cook et al.,
2004; Brockman and Chung, 2001). Using various repurchase simulation strategies, our study
attempts to resolve these differences by using granular proxies of repurchase flexibility (fre-
quency, volume and value) to assess how they are altered under different conditions of option
exercisability and moneyness. We hypothesise that firms retain more opportunities to repur-
chase shares while options remain unexercisable which consequently allows for greater timing
opportunities at prices below option strike price, ultimately lowering the cost of funding un-
derlying grants. This argument enables us to test whether repurchase volume, value and
frequency are higher while stock options are unexercisable and out-of-the-money.
We support this view of the option funding hypothesis by examining repurchase behaviour
under option exercisability and moneyness conditions around a change in regulation that
enabled firms to hold repurchased shares as treasury stock, a practice widely believed to
provide capital cost savings. In the U.K., all repurchased shares had to be cancelled prior
to 2003 but the introduction of a new regulation enabled firms to hold repurchased shares
as treasury stock. Hence, if the cost savings are realisable, we predict that such savings
would be more prominent in the post-regulation era as opposed to the pre-regulation period,
when repurchases were predominantly undertaken when options became exercisable and in-
the-money.
Our findings demonstrate an economic and statistically significant change in repurchase
volume (value) associated with proportional increases in option holdings, conditional on exer-
cisability and moneyness. We find daily repurchase volume (value) increase by 78 (214) basis
points for a percent increase in options that were not exercisable and out-of-the-money. The
corresponding economic magnitude for changes in options when they were exercisable and/or
in-the-money revealed far smaller changes in repurchase behaviour. Observing repurchase fre-
quency revealed qualitatively similar results, demonstrating a higher repurchase incidence rate
for a percent increase in options that were not exercisable and were not in-the-money, relative
to when they were exercisable and/or in-the-money.
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The change in treasury regulation was also seen to significantly impact how firms repur-
chase shares in the open-market. With the adoption of new regulation enabling firms to hold
repurchased shares as treasury, our findings show that firms increased the volume (value) of
repurchases in the new regulatory period as the levels of stock options that were not exer-
cisable and not in-the-money increased. Similar pattern were observed for the frequency of
repurchases at weekly or monthly aggregations. Conversely, we observe firms reducing their
repurchase volume (value) and frequency in the new regulation period if stock options were
exercisable and out-of-the-money, thus highlighting the impact of the regulatory change on
repurchase flexibility and, consequentially, on option funding.
To further illustrate the role of repurchase flexibility in mitigating funding costs of stock
option grants, we adopt a bootstrap method to assess different repurchase implementation
behaviours and compare their costs against actuals to determine if firms realise tangible flex-
ibility benefits. Our findings show that in the pre-regulatory change period when firms are
unable to hold repurchased shares in treasury, actual repurchase prices (relative to simulated)
were higher, yielding significantly higher costs. This is not surprising since most pre-regulatory
period repurchases are concentrated around option exercisability, leading to repurchase prices
close to option exercise prices. This is however not the case in the post-regulatory period as
simulated prices are mostly similar or worse than actual repurchase prices, thus indicating a
firm’s ability to exercise its flexibility in share repurchases. These results largely pertain whilst
holding constant the exercisability and moneyness conditions of stock options.
Our analysis provides a comprehensive illustration of the option funding hypothesis, driven
by the flexibility inherent in share repurchases. We extend the existing research of Weisbenner
(2000), Fenn and Liang (2001), Kahle (2002) and Bens et al. (2003) by incorporating extensive
details of exercisability and moneyness of stock options. Our research also contributes to
the understanding of repurchase flexibility by examining the role of treasury shares. This
analysis and its further implications to shareholders greatly benefit from the data granularity
provided by daily repurchase disclosure in the U.K.. Finally, our study also adds to the growing
evidence on the contributions of buyback implementations on firm motivations. Recent studies
of Ben-Rephael et al. (2014) and Dittmar and Field (2015) make use of monthly buyback
disclosures to infer their role in market timing. Utilising daily repurchase data and framing
these within the confines of option funding make for a more finely defined and more accurate
evaluation of anti-dilutive repurchase programmes.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the next section discusses the research
motivation and the hypotheses tested; Section 3 introduces the sample data, distribution of
daily repurchases and preliminary statistics on the data used in this study; Section 4 presents
the empirical results and their implications; and Section 5 concludes.
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2 Motivation and hypotheses
Share repurchases have driven the shift in corporate payout policy since the 1990s, becom-
ing more prominent than dividend payments (Skinner, 2008). Various theories, signalling
(Vermaelen, 1981) and undervaluation (Ikenberry et al., 1995) among others, have motivated
attempts to understand the importance of repurchases in corporate payout. However, empiri-
cal evaluations of these motivations have only utilised firms’ intention-to-repurchase through
announcements. The popularity of share repurchases is attributable to the flexibility with
which firms engage in the market to buyback shares, enabling them to announce their in-
tention to repurchase shares without any obligation. Flexibility in buybacks enables firms
to address broad motives over the long-term (Dittmar, 2000). Hence, using announcements
of intentions to repurchase has limited scope in establishing the importance of flexibility in
buybacks.
Emerging evidence that utilises more detailed information on actual share buybacks has
only partly resolved this difficulty. Using daily buyback data from France and Hong Kong,
Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) and Brockman and Chung (2001) studied the impact on liquid-
ity and market timing. A recent study by Ben-Rephael et al. (2014) took advantage of the
newly available information from the U.S. to study the implications of repurchase actions at a
monthly level.1 Using similar monthly-level data, Dittmar and Field (2015) suggest a differ-
ence in buyback behaviour that yields significant abnormal returns for infrequent repurchasers.
We add to this growing body of literature by using daily repurchase transactions to examine
funding of stock options, which various studies suggest as the primary reason for the growth
in share buybacks.
Early work by Stephens and Weisbach (1998) acknowledges that by repurchasing shares
and holding them as treasury, firms are able to meet future option exercises by employees
without increasing the capital cost of funding them. These capital cost savings are realised
relative to the alternative where repurchased shares are first cancelled, followed by a new equity
issue through a seasoned equity offering (SEO).2 This view is further emphasised as the option-
funding hypothesis by Kahle (2002) and Fenn and Liang (2001), who broadly illustrated that
the increasing importance of stock options in the employee compensation plans are directly
related to the role of repurchases in reducing costs associated with stock dilution. As a result,
the ability of firms to not only manage their repurchase activity (when and by how much) but
also to hold on to repurchased shares as treasury plays a key role in managing option funding
1Exchange Act Rule 10b-18, which came in to effect on March 15, 2004, "provides issuers with a
"safe harbor" from liability for manipulation when they repurchase their common stock in the market".
2Conducting the SEO prior to a share repurchase would visibly dilute the holdings of existing share-
holders with no guarantee a repurchase would subsequently occur. Additionally, due to the multiplicity
of option plans per executive with separated exercise dates, the likelihood of firms conducting an SEO
every time an option plan is exercised is low due to their costly (financial and signalling) nature.
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costs prior to any new issue considerations.
While the traditional view of option funding emphasises capital cost savings, these are
variable in nature, dependent on how firms conduct their repurchase activity. Firms could
effectively repurchase shares when options are exercised, thus avoiding the need for an
equity issue. This had widely been the practice in the U.K. until 2003 when all repurchased
shares had to be cancelled or granted to executives and no repurchased shares could be held
in treasury. In this setting, repurchase activity was highly concentrated and the timing,
frequency and size of repurchases is predictable, thus constraining the flexibility in repurchase
payout. Additionally, the market learns to anticipate repurchase activity around option
exercises, thus leading not only to a higher market price for repurchased shares, but also
repurchase price near (or over) option exercise prices. This results in higher variable option
funding costs due to the inability of a firm to repurchase shares unconstrained by option
exercise conditions. Alternatively, in a typical vesting period of around three years of option
unexercisability, firms have ample time opportunity to repurchase shares and retain ability to
adjust volume and value (size) of repurchased shares unconditionally.3 Hence, if options are
in-the-money, firms have a cost incentive to wait for better repurchasing opportunities, while
when options are out-of-the-money, firms have a cost incentive to repurchase if they expect
options to become in-the-money. We test this expanded view of option funding as our central
hypothesis, which we declare in alternative form as follows:
H1 : Firms are likely to repurchase more (in terms of size and frequency) before options
become exercisable and while they are still out-of-the-money, relative to when options become
exercisable (either in- or out-of-the-money).
The hypothesis above provides a finer view of the option funding hypothesis of Kahle
(2002). It also complements the dilution arguments of Galai and Schneller (1978) and Eberhart
(2005), who show dilution cost from options to be approximately linear with the level of grants,
thus making firms more sensitive to the size of repurchase programs. Additionally, it mimics
the intuition of Babenko (2009), who suggests that the likelihood of announcing a program is
higher for firms that have large quantities of unexercisable options. Our approach differs in
assessing the executions of repurchases rather than the announcements of programs.
Our central hypothesis overall assumes that firms want to hold on their repurchased shares
as treasury which enables repurchase flexibility to fund stock options. To more concretely
test this hypothesis, we utilise a change in U.K.’s regulation, which emphasised the benefits
of holding repurchased shares as treasury instead of cancelling them. As mentioned, prior
to 2003, all repurchased shares had to be cancelled, meaning firms had to repurchase shares
3This is time-constrained by option exercise date, meaning as options get closer to exercise, the
flexibility inherent in repurchase to mitigate option funding cost if reduced.
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close to option exercise to mitigate capital cost from new issues. This however contributed
to greater variable funding cost since repurchase prices clustered close to prices when option
were exercised. As a result, our hypothesis H1 would be unlikely to hold in the period
prior to 2003, which we term as pre-treasury period. After the treasury regulation adoption,
firms are able to hold their repurchased shares and use them to mitigate dilution arising out
of option exercise. Hence, firms would be better positioned to make use of the flexibility
in repurchases more in line with H1 hypothesis, resulting in greater (less) repurchase size
and frequency after (before) the new regulation, for options that were unexercisable and
out-of-the-money. Thus, a firm’s repurchase activity would shift from the exercisable to un-
exercisable states of option grants. Hence, we propose extending the first hypothesis as follows:
H2 : Firms are likely to repurchase more (in size and frequency) before options become
exercisable and while they are out-of-the-money, relative to when options become exercisable
(in- or out-of-the-money), subsequent to the 2003 change in treasury regulation than they
were prior to this change in regulation.
The hypotheses H1 and H2 indicate that firms are able to better monitor their repurchase
size with increased flexibility, especially after the adoption of treasury regulation. Similarly,
increased repurchase flexibility post-regulation change would allow a firm to obtain better
relative repurchase prices, as opposed to before regulation change and in states of options
being exercisable and in-the-money. While the prices obtained when options become
exercisable and/or in-the-money could help anti-dilutive options when they are exercised,
the expanded flexibility to repurchase is likely to yield more competitive relative repurchase
prices while options are still unexercisable and out-of-the-money. Hence, in line with prior
hypotheses, we propose the following hypothesis to test if there is tangible value gained by
increased repurchase flexibility:
H3 : Average relative repurchase prices obtained before options become exercisable and
while they are out-of-the-money are likely to be lower, relative to when options become
exercisable (in- or out-of-the-money), subsequent to the change in treasury regulation than
they were prior to this change in regulation.
The hypotheses highlighted above help clarify if share repurchase behaviour enables fund-
ing of stock option grants under the complex dynamics of option exercisability and moneyness.
Additionally, we were also able to contextualise the same relationship in the presence of a reg-
ulation change as to how firms account for repurchased shares and the associated tangible




Similar to Rees (1996), we utilise the U.K. regulatory framework, which requires firms to
disclose their repurchase volumes and prices within one trading day of the transaction date.4
As data on daily buyback implementations are not readily available from secondary sources,
we gathered a list of firms that sought buyback authorities from the Securities Data Company
(SDC) database. We isolated open-market programs from tender-offers or Dutch auctions to
identify 196 firms with repurchase authorities and, using the Perfect Information (PI) database,
verified 2,762 firm-years and 10,623 daily repurchase transactions during the period between
1990 through 2010. Since implementation of an open-market program is non-obligatory, daily
repurchase transactions pertained to only 119 firms in the sample.
In the context of option funding through repurchases, we required that the firm have
provided exercisable dates of various vanilla and long-term incentive option plans of their ex-
ecutives. Information on particular option plans are difficult to track down through annual
reports, especially for all firm executives. Hence, we utilised the BoardEx database to ob-
tain detailed information on option exercisable dates for each firm, by director-option plan.
De Cesari and Ozkan (2015) used the BoardEx in a similar manner, but our approach differs
in how we aggregated information on option exercisable dates in conjunction with daily repur-
chase data to obtain an accurate picture of repurchase behaviour around option exercisability.
Hence, for all directors, we aggregated the data by all option plans that were available for
all years when a plan was active or had options outstanding.5 Collating all available option
plans for each director to determine unique exercisable dates helped us to clarify the number
of options outstanding at different exercisable stages. We then merged these data with our
hand-collected repurchase data. A constraint in the BoardEx data was that their coverage
began in 1999. Thus, when this sample’s data were merged with our repurchase dataset, in-
formation prior to this period was lost. Hence, the merged, final dataset represented 9,129
firm-repurchase days over the final sample period covering 1999 through 2010. These buybacks
corresponded to 80 firms with 39 additional firms in our sample obtaining repurchase author-
ities but not implementing them during the sample period. Table 1 provides a description of
how this sample was compiled.
[TABLE 1 GOES HERE]
4London Stock Exchange Listing Rule 12.4.6 states that "any purchase of a listed company’s own
equity shares by or on behalf of the company or any other member of its group must be notified to a
Regulatory Information Service (RIS) as soon as possible, and in any event by no later than 7:30 a.m.
on the business day following the calendar day on which the purchase occurred."
5Thus, if an option plan fell out of the dataset without expiring, we assumed the plan had either
been exercised or was cancelled.
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3.2 Daily share repurchase distribution
Table 2 below illustrates the distribution of the 9,129 daily repurchases that occured between
1999 and 2010 for our sample firms.
[TABLE 2 GOES HERE]
To understand how repurchases are implemented in the U.K., we illustrate the aggregate
and yearly distributions of repurchase volume, frequency, and cost, at both transaction and
firm-level. We observe that mean (median) volume of repurchases peaked at either ends of the
sample period. An average firm in our sample repurchased approximately 0.10 percent of its
total shares outstanding per transaction, which translated to 1.48 million shares.6 Overall, if
a firm repurchased, it did so on average 12.3 percent of its total shares outstanding through
the open-market over our sample period.
We discovered that the frequency of repurchase transactions during the sample period was
greater when mean (median) volumes were low, suggesting that the firms, while repurchasing
fewer shares, were doing so with less intensity but with activity spread over long periods.
In contrast to Dittmar and Field (2015), who provide frequency statistics based on a firm’s
monthly repurchase activities, our sample firms that transacted did so at an average of 114
times during our sample period.7 The cost statistic further shows this frequency of repurchase
transaction, where the mean (median) cost to firm or per transaction was noticeably lower from
2001 to 2006. Our sample firms spent approximately 0.10 percent of their market value per
transaction (similar to number of shares), resulting in an average outlay of 5.1 million (GBP)
on a repurchase day. Overall, repurchasing firms bought back approximately 11.9 percent of
their relative market value over our entire sample period.8
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 below details the summary means, medians and standard deviations of the variables
across the whole sample and sub-samples of repurchasing firms of this study.
[TABLE 3 GOES HERE]
Univariate tests suggested that differences between repurchasing and non-repurchasing
firms were significantly different on all measures used in the study. We found repurchasing
6Average number of shares outstanding for our sample firms was 1.48 billion. Similarly, average
market value of sample firms was GBP 5.1 billion.
7Due to the unbalanced nature of our data, not all firms are active during the entire sample period.
8The measures of volume, frequency and cost do not account for closed periods in the U.K.. London
Stock Exchange Listing Rules 12.2, since been superseded by the EU Market Abuse Regulation (EU)
No 596/2014 sets out limits on trading by companies and managers during price-sensitive periods.
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firms to be larger (proxied by market value), but with increased investment opportunities
(proxied by market-to-book ratio). These statistics are partially in line with agency theory
expectations, which predict that larger firms choose to repurchase shares as they transition to a
mature stage (Grullon and Michaely, 2004). Relative to non-repurchasing firms, repurchasing
firms were found to be highly leveraged and to possess lower amounts of cash, while also
exhibiting lower volatility, lower spread, and past stock returns. This implies that potential
costs from transacting in the market might be lower for firms repurchasing shares.
All these variables entered as controls in our study, with our main variables of interest being
aggregate and segregated levels of director stock options. Our measure of stock options include
both vanilla and long-term incentive plan (LTIP) options, the latter being very prominent
in the U.K. Here, sample repurchasing firms were found to have issued fewer stock options
relative to non-repurchasing firms. When segregated on option exercisability and moneyness,
repurchasing firms again showed significantly lower levels of both exercisable and unexercisable
grants, either in- or out-of-the-money.9 Overall, the univariate statistics and test results
suggest that repurchasing firms differ markedly on many measures used in our study.10 We
now discuss test as to whether these differences hold up in a multivariate setting using dynamic
and count models. These results are discussed in the next section.
4 Empirical findings
4.1 Repurchase size
We evaluate the option funding motivation by first examining the influence of increasing
levels of option grants and their exercisability and moneyness conditions on levels of daily
repurchases. The flexibility in repurchase is first examined by the size (volume and value)
of daily repurchase transactions, and a firm’s behaviour to manage it based on underlying
levels and conditions (exercisability and moneyness) of stock options. As we motivated earlier,
repurchase flexibility could result in either an increase or decrease in repurchase sizes. However,
in the option funding context, we expect to observe an increasing relationship between levels
of stock options and repurchase size. Where this relationship becomes most apparent in the
mix of exercisability and moneyness conditions will be determined by the timing and cost
benefits of repurchase flexibility in funding option grants to a firm. Hence, in line with our
stated hypothesis, we examine this relationship in Table 4 below.
9Univariate tests show repurchasing firms to have fewer proportional vanilla and LTIP options
outstanding, at different levels of option exercisability and moneyness. Results are available upon
request.
10We also conducted a correlation test and confirmed an absence of co-linearity between our variables.
Results are also available upon request.
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[TABLE 4 GOES HERE]
The results presented in Table 4 above are determined using a dynamic system generalised
method of moments (GMM) regression in a panel framework that included a one-day lagged
value of the relevant dependent variable as an additional control. We employ this dynamic
model to account for various market-level constraints on volume and price, which frequently
cause a firm’s repurchase action to be spread over multiple days, thus creating serial depen-
dency in the dependent variable. With respect to instruments, to avoid proliferation, we
limited the number of lags the model could employ to one.11 This method was applied to
two measures of repurchase size: volume and value. We defined repurchase volume as the
number of shares repurchased as a percentage of the total shares outstanding, while value as
the daily outlay spent on repurchases (i.e. the number of shares repurchased multiplied by
repurchase price) as a percentage of daily market value. In addition, we controlled for various
firm-level fundamentals, including size, investment opportunity, leverage, cash, asset return,
return volatility, bid-ask spread and dividend-payer status as indicated by a binary variable.
Consistent with the findings of Fenn and Liang (2001) and Kahle (2002), our results showed
that increasing levels of aggregate stock options yielded higher repurchase size, leading firms
to repurchase more shares as the levels of aggregate option grants increase to reduce dilution.
Economically, we observed a 38 basis point increase in daily repurchase volume for a percent
increase in aggregate stock options outstanding. Moreover, consistent with our expectations of
repurchase flexibility and option funding, we observed a 78 basis point increase in repurchase
volume for a one-percent increase in unexercisable, out-of-the-money option levels. Moreover,
increased repurchases for increasing levels of exercisable options (both in- and out-of-the-
money) were economically weaker but statistically still significant. This indicates that firms
overall tend to prefer repurchasing shares while options are still unexercisable and out-of-the-
out-of-the-moneymoney, thus enabling more timing opportunities.
Changing the identifier to repurchase value (columns 3 and 4) yielded similar results.
Quantitatively, a percent increase in aggregate options outstanding led to a 65 basis points
increase in daily repurchase value, and a large proportion of this effect was again driven by
unexercisable, out-of-the-money options. This resulted in a 2.15 percent increase in daily
repurchase value per percent increase in the same option group, further indicating a desire for
firms to repurchase when they are not time constrained by option exercise. Thus, options that
are exercisable (in or out-of-the-money) and in-the-money unexercisable options yield much
lower economic effects on daily repurchase behaviour.
All control variables we specified contributed significantly to the determination of daily
transaction size. A firm’s repurchase activity increased relative to firm size, leverage, return
11These models were estimated using the xtdpdsys command in Stata, with the twostep option
and a single lagged dependent variable as instrument (excluded from results, for brevity). The model
was found to be robust to inclusion of more lags as instruments.
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on assets and volatility, all of which reinforce the flexibility motivation behind repurchases.
Economically, the effect on repurchase behaviour is stronger than that identified with options,
showing greater changes in repurchase frequency with proportional increases in firm leverage,
return on assets and return volatility. While they do indicate the multi-dimensional nature
of motives behind repurchases, these variables act as controls while retaining our focus on
stock options. The firms in the sample also reduced their volume when spreads widened or
when lagged returns increased, showing a tendency not to repurchase as costs increase. Our
cash variable captured the permanent component of firm cash resource, thus confirming the
arguments of Stephens and Weisbach (1998).
To further support the anti-dilutive, option funding argument, we re-examined the specifi-
cations presented in Table 4 by including dummy and continuous variables of treasury shares
that distinguished between the U.K.’s different regulatory periods. The dummy variable Trea-
sury defined when firms were able to hold repurchased shares as treasury, and so minimise
their cost of funding stock options (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998). We interacted this variable
with our primary variables of interest, and Table 5 below displays the results of this analysis.
[TABLE 5 GOES HERE]
In the specification of Table 5, we interact the Treasury dummy variable with both aggre-
gate and segregated measures of option holdings, while also keeping the main effects of the
latter variables. In the specification, this results in the main effect as the pre-treasury effect of
stock options on repurchase size, with the interaction term indicating the difference between
treasury periods. Our findings here are qualitatively similar to those displayed in Table 4,
although the inclusion of the Treasury dummy increases the roles option exercisability and
moneyness play in daily repurchase implementation.
We find the pre-treasury effect of aggregate options to significantly influence both repur-
chase volume (35 bps) and value (62 bps), but the economic and statistical significance remains
unchanged in the post-treasury period, as highlighted by the interaction term. This interpre-
tation is altered when we segregate the option grants variable (columns 2 and 4). We found
exercisable options (both in- and out-of-the-money) to be a significant driver of repurchase
activity prior to the adoption of the treasury regulation as indicated by the main, uninteracted
variables. However, in the post-treasury period, both moneyness levels of exercisable options
showed significant economic decline in their relationship to repurchase size. Either moneyness
segregations of exercisable options indicated an under 20 bps change (difference in main and
interaction coefficients) in repurchase volume and value. Conversely, the economic importance
of unexercisable, out-of-the-money options increased repurchase volume (value) by 1.05 (2.43)
percent points from pre-treasury levels of approximately -20 bps for a percent increase in the
option levels. This finding further shows that when given the flexibility to repurchase in order
to fund option grants, firms will prefer to shift their repurchase behaviour while options are
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still unexercisable and out-of-the-money. This is in line with our expectations regarding the
increasing significance of unexercisable grants, which appear to increase repurchase flexibility
for firms wishing to fund their option grants. All control variables continue to show similar
economic and statistical significance as observed in Table 4.
Overall, our results indicate that the relationship between stock options and repurchase
size is sensitive to the segregation of stock options based on exercisability and moneyness
conditions, as well as to the treasury period. This lends support for our hypothesis that firms
do repurchase more shares and invest proportionally more as payout flexibility is enhanced
before options become exercisable and when they are out-of-the-money.
4.2 Repurchase frequency
The second metric that we use to assess the significance of repurchase flexibility in funding
option grants is through the periodic counting of repurchase transactions. Recent study by
Dittmar and Field (2015) found firms exercising their flexibility by repurchasing on fewer oc-
casions for better market timing. However, as we highlighted earlier, such levels of aggregation
disguise the true repurchase intensity as they do not reveal if repurchase transactions are un-
dertaken in just a single trading day or every trading day within a group. With our daily
repurchase data, we are better placed to more accurately determine if flexibility drives firms
to repurchase more or less often to fund option grants.
In the option funding context, firms have the possibility to repurchase either while stock op-
tions are still unexercisable, or wait until options become exercisable. A problem with waiting
for exercisability is that repurchases would be so highly concentrated markets could anticipate
such a behaviour. This would also result in repurchase prices being pushed higher, resulting in
higher option funding costs. Alternatively, repurchasing while options are still unexercisable
does utilise cash early, but provides firms with ample repurchasing time flexibility. Hence, we
should expect that as the anti-dilution needs of a firm increases with increasing levels of stock
options, a firm can benefit by timing share repurchases before options become exercisable, and
are out-of-the-money. Repurchasing after options become exercisable constrains flexibility as
a firm is driven more by the exercise needs of the option holder and less by the flexibility
apparent in repurchase programs. We illustrate our findings in Table 6 below.
[TABLE 6 GOES HERE]
Observing the univariate summary statistics on repurchase frequency (Table 2), we notice
that the repurchase tendencies of firms are widely dispersed, rendering a standard count model
biased in estimated standard errors. The negative binomial model accounts for this over-
dispersion in count by estimating the standard errors independently of the means.12 In this
12Due to the unbalanced nature of our data, not all firms are active during the entirety of our sample
13
regard, we employed this model in both monthly and weekly groupings of repurchase frequency
to make use of our dataset’s granularity. For both monthly and weekly frequency grouping,
we collate a firm’s total count of repurchase transactions, with each time grouping taking a
value of zero if no repurchase occurred in that time period. We show results for both time
groups for aggregated and segregated option holdings variables.
The results shown in Table 6 suggest that firms on average increase their payout frequency
by approximately 7 percent in a month for each percent increase in aggregate options outstand-
ing. When segregated, this relationship is driven largely by unexercisable, out-of-the-money
grants, indicating a 26 percent increase in monthly frequency. This amounts to nearly two ad-
ditional repurchase days in a month for a percent increase in unexercisable, out-of-the-money
grants.13 Results based on weekly aggregation of repurchase frequencies (columns 3 and 4)
show economically and statistically stronger associations. While repurchase frequency is still
increasing in aggregate option holdings (14 percent), this is again driven largely by the level
of unexercisable, out-of-the-money grants. However, qualitatively similar results are also ob-
served for exercisable options that are in-the-money, pointing to an additional repurchase day
in a week for each percentage increase in the stated underlying options. We investigate this
result further by assessing the role of the treasury regulation in the option funding hypothesis.
We also found increasing firm size, increasing cash holdings but decreasing investment
opportunities led to increased frequency of repurchases. This is in line with how firms spread
their payout needs as they transition to a mature state (Grullon et al., 2002). Frequency is
sensitive to volatility, spread and lagged returns, indicating the desire by firms to repurchase
more often as the costs associated with such repurchases decline. The economic effect is
consistent across weekly and monthly models and much more strongly for lagged returns which
also indicates an aversion to repurchasing more frequently while market prices are higher (and
vice versa). Finally, we found an economically marginal link between frequency and dividend
payout, indicating a desire amongst dividend paying firms to repurchase more frequently.
Our findings show a more robust understanding of gains in repurchase frequency using
weekly data relative to monthly data aggregations, as a result of increased observations and
less information aggregation. We next tested the validity of these results by interacting the
Treasury dummy variable so as to determine the significance of flexibility in option funding. If
firms valued flexibility in repurchasing shares more broadly (as opposed to only repurchasing
while options are exercisable and cancelling repurchased shares), we should witness a shift
in repurchase behaviour towards increased frequency while options are unexercisable in the
period. As a result, the over-dispersion in the count explanatory variable makes the standard Poisson
model inappropriate for a robust estimation. Hence, following Cameron and Trivedi (2008), we employ
the negative binomial model that allows us to relax the conditional variance, mean conditions while
also accounting for the dispersion through an additional parameter.
13Sample firms on average repurchase 114 times over the sample life, but 8 times during a repurchase
month and 3 times during a repurchase week.
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post-treasury period. These results are tested in Table 7 below.
[TABLE 7 GOES HERE]
Changes in repurchase behaviour between regulation periods are qualitatively similar to
the results displayed in Table 5, as are the implications for funding option grants. In the case
of aggregate stock options (columns 1 and 3), the monthly count models showed relatively
weaker economic and statistical power. At the weekly level, the incidence of repurchases
increased by 26 percent in the pre-treasury period for each percent increase in aggregate
options (main effect). This association is weakened in the post-treasury period as we see a
decline of about 12 percent (interaction coefficient of 0.8852) in weekly repurchases relative
to the pre-treasury period for a percent increase in aggregate option levels. This indicates
that while increases in aggregate options still yield higher repurchase frequencies, this rate is
lower in the post-treasury period relative to that in the pre-treasury period. Findings for the
segregated variables are much more informative (columns 2 and 4), as we observe differing
patterns for both exercisability and moneyness conditions of stock options. While firms in
the pre-treasury period exhibited significantly lower repurchase frequencies before options
were exercisable (63 percent lower frequency than weekly average, per percent increase in
unexercisable, out-of-the-money options), this effect is reversed in the post-treasury period by
a factor of 3.76 relative to pre-treasury levels, yielding positive increases in weekly repurchase
frequency for a percent increase in unexercisable, out-of-the-money options. Similar results
are observed at the monthly level.
Alternatively, pre-treasury levels of exercisable, out-of-the-money options yield higher re-
purchase frequency (than monthly or weekly averages) but this effect too is reversed in the
post-treasury period. At the extreme, we find the weekly frequency of exercisable, out-of-the-
money options to be nearly 50 percent lower than pre-treasury levels. This implies that firms
were repurchasing fewer times in the post-treasury period for a percent increase in exercisable,
out-of-the-money options. Interestingly, this behaviour was only concentrated in the out-of-
the-money portions of stock options as we did not observe any change in repurchase behaviour
between regulatory periods for in-the-money options.
Overall, our findings here suggest a significant relation between levels of aggregated and
segregated options holdings and the frequency with which a firm repurchases. Firms were
more likely to increase their repurchase counts with increasing levels of unexercisable grants
that were not in-the-money, predominantly in the post-treasury regulation period. This is in
contrast to the observations for exercisable, out-of-the-money grants, where the frequency was
lower for increasing levels of the grants, especially in the post-treasury period. These findings
suggest that firms indeed saw the ability to hold repurchased shares as an advantage in funding
option grants, which was fulfilled through repurchasing early and while options were out-of-the-
money. Whether this repurchase behaviour resulted in better market timing opportunities and
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lower option funding cost remains unanswered. We address this issue next, while considering
conditions of option exercisability, moneyness and treasury regulation periods.
4.3 Bootstrapped repurchase costs
Our findings above illustrate that in the context of stock options pre-treasury regulation repur-
chases were concentrated around options that were exercisable and out-of-the-money but the
introduction of treasury regulation shifted that behaviour towards unexercisable, out-of-the-
money options. The change in repurchase behaviour was rational since repurchasing before
option become exercisable provide more time flexibility in the anti-dilution objective. These
shifts in behaviour would also be justified if the implied cost of repurchasing shares were to be
reduced in the post-treasury regulation period. This is formally declared under our third hy-
pothesis (H3 ), wherein using granular repurchase implementation data, we look to determine
if repurchase prices were better than alternative market prices in the post-regulation period
under various exercisability and moneyness conditions of stock options.
We adopt the bootstrap scenarios suggested by Brockman and Chung (2001) and
Cook et al. (2004). More specifically, we compared actual daily weighted average repurchase
price to alternative bootstrapped prices based on various implementation scenarios. The sce-
narios we adopt for the test are minimum volume, average volume and maximum volume where
the minimum, mean and maximum daily repurchase volume are separately bootstrapped over
the sample period to generate a randomised sample in each scenario. More concretely, we
first aggregated total shares repurchased by each firm in our sample, during the sample pe-
riod and then determined, for each alternative scenario, the number of trading days needed
for the firm to fulfil its actual repurchase implementation size. This is done to ensure that
the aggregate repurchase volume remains the same across all scenarios, relative to the actual
repurchase size, while the price is randomly assigned based on number of trading days under
each setting. Hence, under each instance and scenario, the volume remained constant but
the number of bootstrapped repurchase days that a firm could have repurchased (but had
not) differed between scenarios. Each bootstrap scenario was then repeated 100 times over
non-repurchase days in our sample period to enable the determination of mean daily prices.
For each scenario, the randomly determined prices were then scaled by the actual weighted
mean daily repurchase price to establish if actual repurchase prices were better (i.e. a ratio
greater than 1) or worse (ratio lower than 1).
We illustrate how the bootstrap method is operationalised with an example. A sample
company repurchased ten times during its sample life of 10 years with aggregate repurchase
volume of 500,000 shares. Over the ten repurchase transactions, the smallest repurchase
(minimum) transaction size was 10,000 shares, while the largest repurchase (maximum) was
100,000. The mean repurchase size was 50,000. In the bootstrap setting, for the minimum
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(maximum) size scenario, a repurchase volume of 10,000 (100,000) was randomly drawn 50
(5) times per run from the non-repurchase days so that the aggregate volume equated to the
actual repurchase volume. This randomisation is repeated 100 times to determine aggregate
bootstrapped prices as well as means across different states of stock option grants. These
means are then, individually, scaled by the actual weighted mean repurchase price (aggregate
and segregated) to establish a market timing metric. If the ratio is greater than 1, this would
imply that actual repurchase prices obtained were lower than bootstrapped ones, thus resulting
in better market timing, and vice versa.
Since the scenarios randomly assigned repurchase days, we were also able to test for a
firm’s market timing ability across treasury regulation states. In the treasury setting, we
would expect firms to exhibit better timing ability post-regulation change due to increased
flexibility from the ability to hold on to repurchased shares as treasury. Similarly, we should
expect to observe firms obtaining better market prices when options were not exercisable and
were out-of-the-money as they enable greatest repurchase flexibility. Our findings are shown
in Table 8 below.
[TABLE 8 GOES HERE]
Panel A in Table 8 above shows aggregate values across all alternative settings. As can be
seen, firms on average possessed timing ability in the mean (ratio greater than 1) but not in
the medians (except in closing price strategy). Barring average volume, bootstrapped medians
are only marginally lower (6 to 62 basis points), suggesting that firms do marginally worse
with their repurchase timing. However, when we split the data between treasury periods, we
consistently observe significantly better timing at the median in the post-regulation period.
The range of difference in timing ability between the treasury periods is around 10 percentage
points across different settings, thus illustrating that repurchases were, by and large, better
aligned to option funding given the ability to hold repurchase shares in treasury. Mean boot-
strapped prices do show better timing in the pre-treasury period, but the difference between
mean and median suggests a highly skewed distribution.
Panels B-D examine the same bootstrapped repurchase data under different conditions of
option exercisability and moneyness. Since most of our earlier findings indicate a firm’s pref-
erence to repurchase while options are unexercisable and out-of-the-money (due to increased
repurchase flexibility), we were primarily interested in how timing of share repurchases for af-
fected option characteristics are altered relative to this unexercisable, out-of-the-money option
state. In the findings shown in Panel B, we considered the difference in moneyness parameters,
holding the unexercisable state of stock options fixed. To aid our understanding, we sought
to determine if on bootstrapped repurchase days a firm had a larger proportion of out-of-the-
money, unexercisable options, relative to in-the-money options. In line with our predictions
that firms can enjoy more flexibility in their repurchase when options are out-of-the-money, we
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found that, on aggregate, firms do better in timing their repurchases when they possess larger
proportions of out-of-the-money, unexercisable options, relative to in-the-money options. This
is not conditional on a firm’s implementation strategy as the aggregate mean and median were
significantly higher, yielding a ratio greater than 1. When observing segregation by treasury
period and consistent with our expectations that post-treasury period would yield better tim-
ing opportunities, we find that the difference between the two ratio groups was much greater
in the post-regulation period, with consistently better timing when firms held relatively larger
proportions of unexercisable, out-of-the-money options. Finally, observing the significance of
difference in ratios across regulation periods, we witness the effect of treasury regulation im-
pact on all settings except for maximum volume strategy thus highlighting the importance of
the regulation in a firm’s ability to exercise flexibility in option funding.
In Panel C, we hold the out-of-the-money state of stock options constant and compare
between exercisable and unexercisable states of stock options across all alternative repurchase
settings. Similar to Panel B, we complement our findings by splitting the comparison to groups
with proportionally more unexercisable options (Ratio > 1) to groups with proportionally
more exersiable options (Ratio < 1). Holding the moneyness parameter constant, we should
expect firms to have better timing ability when proportionally larger number of unexercisable
options are outstanding and in the post-regulation period. However, in the out-of-the-money
state, the difference between the two groups of options outstanding might be small as also
witnessed in our multivariate findings. As our aggregate findings show, firms between two
stock option states do not differ much at the mean across strategies, but observing the median
shows firms to largely do better in timing when larger proportions of unexercisable options
are outstanding. This observation is also maintained when comparing the findings across
treasury periods. With means highly skewed in the pre-treasury period, large unexercisable
option groups do show better market timing at the median relative to the alternative, but the
overall timing is still poor (ratio of less than 1, except minimum volume scenario). The effect
of treasury regulation again shows significant changes with median values consistently better
across scenarios (barring maximum volume).
Finally, in Panel D, both the exercisability and moneyness parameters have been adjusted
by comparing the levels of unexercisable, out-of-the-money options to those for exercisable, in-
the-money options. These findings largely mimic those displayed in Panel B for the aggregate
but the most visible change is observed in the comparison between treasury regulation periods.
We observe better timing ability for firms having more out-of-the-money, unexercisable options
across all scenarios in the post-regulation period while the difference between the two groups
remain unclear in the pre-treasury period. This again highlights the significance of the treasury
regulation change, especially for unexercisable, out-of-the-money option states when flexibility
to repurchase is most prominent.
Overall, the bootstrapped results suggest that firms are able to capitalise on increased
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repurchase flexibility that yields better repurchase prices, especially when holding larger pro-
portions of stock options that were not exercisable and were not in-the-money, and when such
repurchases were undertaken in the post-treasury regulation period. Interestingly, we do find
the maximum volume alternative has weak statistical power, suggesting that by concentrating
repurchases in short bursts, prices obtained were no different across treasury periods. These
findings are robust to different scenarios of repurchase implementation, although the power of
the test varies between scenarios.
5 Conclusion
Share repurchases have become the dominant means through which firms execute their payout
policy, driven primarily by the flexibility inherent in share repurchases, which enables firms
to implement open-ended programmes without any commitment (Sonika et al., 2014). This
flexibility has an important bearing on how, when and if firm stock options are anti-diluted. In
this regard, contradictory evidence and insufficient data resources highlight a disagreement on
the role of option conditions (i.e., exercisability and moneyness) on repurchase implementation.
Our study sought to address these concerns by exploring the significance of stock option
exercisability and moneyness conditions on actual firm repurchase behaviour.
Using a unique sample of daily repurchase transactions from the U.K., we examined the
effect on daily repurchase volume, value and periodic frequency as proxies of repurchase flexi-
bility when firms were driven to fund their outstanding stock option grants to directors. We
argue that payout flexibility is constrained and predictable; if firms repurchase after option
grants become exercisable and in-the-money, the option exercise needs of a firm drive payout
demands. This constraint results in higher repurchase prices than would be possible otherwise.
Our findings indicate that firms are inclined to repurchase more shares and allocate greater
proportional value to payout if associated grants are unexercisable and out-of-the-money. We
observed a 78 (214) basis points increase in repurchase volume (value) per percent increase in
outstanding unexercisable, out-of-the-money options. Correspondingly, economic significance
of other option exercisable states was positive, but at least 60 percent lower. Similar results oc-
curred when repurchase frequency was considered, with identical repurchase incidence rates for
unexercisable, out-of-the-money and exercisable, in-the-money options in weekly regressions.
These findings were, however, sensitive to the degree of flexibility in repurchasing shares. Using
a change in regulation that enabled firms to hold repurchased shares as treasury, we found our
results to be valid across regulatory periods. As we demonstrated, repurchase volume, value
and frequency increased post treasury regulation for firms holding large proportions of total
options as unexercisable and out-of-the-money. Similarly, we found the repurchase volume,
value and frequency reduced for exercisable options.
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The argument that firms repurchase shares early in the option’s vesting schedule and while
they are out-of-the-money implies a role for repurchase flexibility plays in funding option
grants. As a result, this flexibility should confer better (lower) repurchase prices for a firm.
We tested this in a bootstrap exercise that replicated a firm’s repurchase behaviour over non-
repurchase days using various implementation strategies. As our findings demonstrated, firms
typically obtain repurchase prices better than simulated prices, and when they held larger
proportions of unexercisable, out-of-the-money options (relative to other option states). More
importantly, results appears sensitive to the treasury period as well as the states of option
exercisability and moneyness. Firms were able to obtain better prices in repurchases over
simulated cases in the post-regulation period and while options were unexercisable and out-
of-the-money. These findings were robust to comparison with alternative cases and strategies
determined through simulation.
Our study is most closely related to those described in the literature addressing the re-
lationship between share buybacks and stock options (Fenn and Liang, 2001; Kahle, 2002;
Bens et al., 2003). While the state of option grants may not economically be a primary driver
in determining repurchase behaviour, the dilution implication from stock options is visible,
and the empirical evidence fills a gap in our understanding of how and why firms execute
share repurchases. Our study also circumvents the anti-dilutive arguments of total payout
(Cuny et al., 2009) by illustrating the manner in which firms undertake their daily repur-
chases under conditions of option exercisability and moneyness. Consequently, our study also
extends the evidence surrounding the frequency of buybacks (Dittmar and Field, 2015) by
using a more granular daily transaction dataset to explore the impact on repurchase con-
tinuity. Evidence on the anti-dilutive implications of buybacks supports the suggestion of
Ben-Rephael et al. (2014) that firms should be required to disclose their actual repurchases
more frequently than quarterly as currently required in the U.S.. This should enable a re-
assessment of payout motives based on actual buyback activity instead of a non-committal
intention to repurchase only.
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Table 1: Sample selection criteria
This table describes the selection criteria used to determine the sample data for the study, illustrating the breakdown of
the unique number of firms used in the study. Identification of firms is done using data from Securities Data Company
(SDC) database and subsequently filtered to arrive at a unique set of firms. This is done due to the multiplicity of
announcements by each firm in SDC not captured by database. We then detail the composition of the sample data after
merging with BoardEx to utilise information on stock option exercisability. Since the BoardEx data begins in 1999,
all observations prior to the period identified through SDC are lost. Final sample comprises 119 firms with repurchase
programs, of which 80 conduct actual repurchases.
Description Number of Firms/Days




- Events attributed to financial and utility firms 338
302
- Duplicate entries of repurchase intentions to identify unique list of firms 62
240
- Firm identifiers not available to match information on Datastream/Worldscope 36
204
- Annual report information not available in Perfect Information 8
196
- Firms not matched with BoardEx 77
Total number of firm identified in the sample period from 1999 to 2010 119
Subset of authority firms that repurchase during the period of 1999 to 2010 80



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Descriptive statistics
This table shows the descriptive statistics of sample firms used in the study. The table shows means, medians and
standard deviation for all sample firms, differentiated between repurchasing and non-repurchasing. p-value for a two-
sided difference in means and Kruskal-Wallis rank test is also reported. Definition of how the variables are computed is
provided in the appendix (Table A1).
Repurchasing firms (N = 80) Non-repurchasing firms (N = 39) p-value of difference
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median
Treasury shares 0.0252 0.0000 0.1270 0.0033 0.0000 0.0400 0.0000 0.0001
Size 16,985 5,325 27,836 4,700 234.8 16,071 0.0000 0.0001
Market-to-book 1.9500 1.6210 1.9780 1.7050 1.3380 2.4770 0.0000 0.0001
Leverage 0.2000 0.1800 0.1670 0.1360 0.1040 0.1500 0.0000 0.0001
Cash 0.1080 0.0660 0.1230 0.1310 0.0744 0.3720 0.0000 0.0002
Return on assets 0.1480 0.1290 0.1320 0.1010 0.1100 0.1970 0.0000 0.0001
Return volatility 0.2450 0.2140 0.1220 0.3200 0.2810 0.1770 0.0000 0.0001
Average spread 1.8520 1.3440 4.1070 5.8460 2.6550 13.8800 0.0000 0.0001
Lagged return 0.0075 0.0484 0.2340 0.0139 0.0503 0.3570 0.0129 0.0001
Dividend payout 48.6400 52.0100 21.7000 39.7900 42.6600 28.6300 0.0000 0.0001
Total options 0.0046 0.0016 0.0100 0.0107 0.0033 0.0181 0.0000 0.0000
Unexercisable, in-the-money options 0.0004 0.0000 0.0014 0.0014 0.0000 0.0045 0.0000 0.0001
Unexercisable, out-of-the-money options 0.0015 0.0001 0.0050 0.0024 0.0000 0.0069 0.0000 0.0001
Exercisable, in-the-money options 0.0006 0.0000 0.0024 0.0023 0.0000 0.0065 0.0000 0.0001
Exercisable, out-of-the-money options 0.0020 0.0004 0.0060 0.0042 0.0001 0.0111 0.0000 0.0001
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Table 4: Size of repurchase (volume and value) and option holdings
This table shows the dynamic panel estimates of sample firms used in the study. The dependent variable in Columns (1)
and (2) is the daily percentage of shares repurchased (scaled by shares outstanding), while in columns (3) and (4) is the
daily percentage of value repurchased (scaled by market value). Option holdings is aggregate options outstanding scaled
by total shares outstanding. Unexercisable and exercisable options are segregations of aggregate options outstanding
based on exercisable date for all outstanding option plans at a firm-level. Both variables are scaled by total shares
outstanding. Other control variables are as described in the appendix (Table A1). *, ** and *** refer to a two-sided t-
test representing 10%, 5% and 1% statistical significance. Also shown are p-values from a Sargan test for overidentification
of instruments, and the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation using AR(1) and AR(2) tests.
Repurchase volume Repurchase value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total options 0.0038*** 0.0065***
(6.10) (6.01)
Unexercisable, in-the-money options -0.0023 -0.0032*
(-1.26) (-1.74)
Unexercisable, out-of-the-money options 0.0078*** 0.0214***
(3.93) (9.38)
Exercisable, in-the-money options 0.0027*** 0.0071***
(2.90) (8.62)
Exercisable, out-of-the-money options 0.0030*** 0.0043***
(7.48) (7.23)
Treasury shares -0.0023*** -0.0016** -0.0045*** -0.0016*
(-2.66) (-1.98) (-4.50) (-1.93)
Size 0.0048*** 0.0044*** 0.0080*** 0.0051***
(5.59) (5.06) (7.77) (4.01)
Market-to-book -0.0028*** -0.0022*** -0.0031*** -0.0025***
(-24.63) (-22.43) (-22.36) (-21.05)
Leverage 0.0312*** 0.0319*** 0.0400*** 0.0413***
(6.20) (6.08) (6.04) (6.12)
Cash -0.0069*** -0.0051*** -0.0104*** -0.0061***
(-7.02) (-6.61) (-9.56) (-7.15)
Return on assets 0.0409*** 0.0321*** 0.0589*** 0.0379***
(9.17) (9.07) (11.88) (9.62)
Return volatility 0.0413*** 0.0430*** 0.0807*** 0.0789***
(7.89) (7.83) (15.37) (13.87)
Average spread -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0007*** -0.0007***
(-4.57) (-5.00) (-6.67) (-6.56)
Lagged return -0.0079*** -0.0089*** -0.0104*** -0.0105***
(-8.75) (-8.95) (-13.48) (-10.40)
Dividend payout -0.0000** -0.0000*** 0.0000 -0.0000
(-2.45) (-3.03) (0.92) (-0.19)
Constant -0.0308*** -0.0277*** -0.0551*** -0.0365***
(-4.54) (-4.09) (-7.90) (-4.41)
Sargan p-value 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014 0.0014
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test 0.3638 0.3759 0.6154 0.5751
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 232,563 232,563 232,563 232,563
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Table 5: Size of repurchase (volume and value) and option holdings: Treasury
This table shows linear panel estimates of sample firms used in the study, adjusting for Treasury regulation. The
dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) is the daily percentage of shares repurchased (scaled by shares outstanding),
while in columns (3) and (4) is the daily percentage of value repurchased (scaled by market value). Option holdings is
aggregate options outstanding scaled by total shares outstanding. Unexercisable and exercisable options are segregations
of aggregate options outstanding based on exercisable date for all outstanding option plans at a firm-level. Both variables
are scaled by total shares outstanding. Other control variables are as described in the appendix (Table A1). *, ** and ***
refer to a two-sided t-test representing 10%, 5% and 1% statistical significance. Also shown are p-values from a Sargan
test for overidentification of instruments, and the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation using AR(1) and AR(2) tests.
Repurchase volume Repurchase value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treasury dummy 0.0005 0.0010 0.0027*** 0.0029*
(0.93) (0.84) (2.73) (1.94)
Total options 0.0035*** 0.0062***
(5.54) (5.86)
Treasury * Total options 0.0004 0.0003
(1.08) (0.40)
Unexercisable, in-the-money options 0.0003 0.0111***
(0.40) (4.53)
Unexercisable, out-of-the-money options -0.0007 -0.0024
(-0.30) (-0.85)
Exercisable, in-the-money options 0.0067*** 0.0058***
(2.82) (2.91)
Exercisable, out-of-the-money options 0.0070*** 0.0114***
(3.61) (4.01)
Treasury * Unexercisable, in-the-money options -0.0024 -0.0137***
(-1.00) (-3.54)
Treasury * Unexercisable, out-of-the-money options 0.0105** 0.0243***
(2.23) (3.92)
Treasury * Exercisable, in-the-money options -0.0046* -0.0022
(-1.87) (-1.00)
Treasury * Exercisable, out-of-the-money options -0.0062*** -0.0115***
(-2.82) (-3.84)
Treasury shares -0.0023*** -0.0022*** -0.0047*** -0.0034***
(-2.66) (-2.79) (-4.84) (-3.78)
Size 0.0048*** 0.0039*** 0.0082*** 0.0067***
(5.61) (4.64) (8.26) (6.93)
Market-to-book -0.0027*** -0.0022*** -0.0031*** -0.0026***
(-24.71) (-21.18) (-22.64) (-21.12)
Leverage 0.0313*** 0.0321*** 0.0404*** 0.0481***
(6.21) (6.05) (6.12) (7.79)
Cash -0.0068*** -0.0062*** -0.0102*** -0.0074***
(-7.05) (-7.77) (-9.74) (-7.99)
Return on assets 0.0406*** 0.0325*** 0.0582*** 0.0377***
(9.24) (8.84) (12.22) (8.94)
Return volatility 0.0416*** 0.0337*** 0.0811*** 0.0601***
(7.88) (7.90) (14.81) (10.77)
Average spread -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0007*** -0.0008***
(-4.57) (-4.65) (-6.55) (-6.63)
Lagged return -0.0079*** -0.0085*** -0.0105*** -0.0114***
(-8.77) (-8.87) (-14.07) (-14.52)
Dividend payout -0.0000** -0.0000** 0.0000 -0.0000
(-2.51) (-2.30) (0.70) (-0.65)
Constant -0.0309*** -0.0234*** -0.0562*** -0.0338***
(-4.57) (-3.88) (-8.26) (-4.64)
Sargan p-value 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test 0.3636 0.3377 0.5435 0.6098
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 232,563 232,563 232,563 232,563
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Table 6: Frequency of repurchase and option holdings
This table shows the repurchase incidence (frequency) rate of sample firms used in the study. The dependent variable
in all columns is a count of repurchases on a monthly (columns 1 and 2) and weekly (columns 3 and 4) basis. Estimates
presented are incidence rates indicating a higher (> 1) or lower (< 1) probability of repurchase. Option holdings is
aggregate options outstanding scaled by total shares outstanding. Unexercisable and exercisable options are segregations
of aggregate options outstanding based on exercisable date for all outstanding option plans at a firm-level. Both variables
are scaled by total shares outstanding. Other control variables are as described in the appendix (Table A1). *, ** and
*** refer to a two-sided t-test representing 10%, 5% and 1% statistical significance.
Monthly Weekly
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total options 1.0736** 1.1383***
(2.06) (5.38)
Unexercisable, in-the-money options 0.5547*** 0.6953***
(-2.70) (-2.64)
Unexercisable, out-of-the-money options 1.2642*** 1.2500***
(3.53) (4.67)
Exercisable, in-the-money options 1.0570 1.2357**
(0.47) (2.50)
Exercisable, out-of-the-money options 1.0185 1.0733*
(0.37) (1.90)
Treasury shares 2.5815*** 2.5795*** 1.8281*** 1.8362***
(3.25) (3.24) (3.63) (3.66)
Size 1.0349 1.0265 1.0840*** 1.0774***
(1.44) (1.09) (4.50) (4.13)
Market-to-book 1.0177 1.0213 1.0096 1.0120
(0.66) (0.80) (0.50) (0.62)
Leverage 0.6181** 0.6438* 0.7334* 0.7463*
(-2.04) (-1.86) (-1.95) (-1.83)
Cash 1.0170 0.9912 1.1775*** 1.1361**
(0.22) (-0.11) (2.80) (2.21)
Return on assets 2.2380** 1.9963* 1.3964 1.3305
(2.06) (1.83) (1.21) (1.05)
Return volatility 0.0236*** 0.0275*** 0.0105*** 0.0115***
(-11.78) (-11.20) (-21.72) (-21.10)
Average spread 0.9903 0.9893* 0.9877** 0.9869**
(-1.64) (-1.79) (-2.09) (-2.25)
Lagged return 0.4406*** 0.4378*** 0.3937*** 0.3881***
(-6.64) (-6.68) (-11.67) (-11.78)
Dividend payout 1.0037** 1.0038** 1.0021** 1.0021**
(2.40) (2.47) (2.10) (2.06)
Constant 0.1557*** 0.1632*** 0.1945*** 0.2044***
(-7.46) (-7.23) (-8.95) (-8.63)
Log Likelihood -6080 -6070 -14150 -14140
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 11,014 11,014 47,858 47,858
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Table 7: Frequency of repurchase and option holdings: Treasury
This table shows the repurchase incidence (frequency) rate of sample firms used in the study, adjusting for Treasury
regulation. The dependent variable in all columns is a count of repurchases on a monthly (columns 1 and 2) and weekly
(columns 3 and 4) basis. Estimates presented are incidence rates indicating a higher (> 1) or lower (< 1) probability
of repurchase. Option holdings is aggregate options outstanding scaled by total shares outstanding. Unexercisable and
exercisable options are segregations of aggregate options outstanding based on exercisable date for all outstanding option
plans at a firm-level. Both variables are scaled by total shares outstanding. Other control variables are as described in
the appendix (Table A1). *, ** and *** refer to a two-sided t-test representing 10%, 5% and 1% statistical significance.
Monthly Weekly
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treasury dummy 0.9891 0.9547 1.1015* 1.0224
(-0.14) (-0.56) (1.88) (0.41)
Total options 1.0775 1.2502***
(1.36) (5.44)
Treasury * Total options 0.9954 0.8897***
(-0.08) (-2.79)
Unexercisable, in-the-money options 0.6456 0.7175
(-1.48) (-1.48)
Unexercisable, out-of-the-money options 0.6446* 0.3740***
(-1.78) (-4.20)
Exercisable, in-the-money options 0.7539 0.9452
(-1.08) (-0.30)
Exercisable, out-of-the-money options 1.3377*** 1.6455***
(4.02) (9.61)
Treasury * Unexercisable, in-the-money options 0.7760 1.0854
(-0.58) (0.29)
Treasury * Unexercisable, out-of-the-money options 2.1234*** 3.7620***
(2.99) (5.58)
Treasury * Exercisable, in-the-money options 1.4472 1.2242
(1.32) (1.03)
Treasury * Exercisable, out-of-the-money options 0.6826*** 0.5376***
(-4.33) (-9.61)
Treasury shares 2.5937*** 2.6076*** 1.7658*** 1.7958***
(3.24) (3.26) (3.40) (3.51)
Size 1.0350 1.0271 1.0873*** 1.0831***
(1.44) (1.11) (4.66) (4.42)
Market-to-book 1.0178 1.0343 1.0131 1.0207
(0.66) (1.25) (0.68) (1.04)
Leverage 0.6197** 0.6526* 0.7155** 0.7451*
(-2.02) (-1.80) (-2.09) (-1.83)
Cash 1.0151 1.0556 1.1479** 1.3186***
(0.19) (0.60) (2.36) (3.76)
Return on assets 2.2532** 1.7573 1.4549 1.2622
(2.06) (1.47) (1.35) (0.86)
Return volatility 0.0232*** 0.0257*** 0.0115*** 0.0108***
(-11.43) (-11.02) (-20.28) (-20.26)
Average spread 0.9901 0.9899* 0.9892* 0.9902
(-1.64) (-1.67) (-1.79) (-1.63)
Lagged return 0.4408*** 0.4423*** 0.3924*** 0.3950***
(-6.63) (-6.59) (-11.71) (-11.59)
Dividend payout 1.0036** 1.0037** 1.0024** 1.0020**
(2.36) (2.39) (2.32) (1.98)
Constant 0.1574*** 0.1714*** 0.1692*** 0.1943***
(-6.97) (-6.57) (-9.13) (-8.27)
Log Likelihood -6090 -6070 -14100 -14000
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1: Variable definitions
This table presents the description of variables used in the study. The computation of the explanatory variables is
provided as the description, along with their respective Datastream/Worldscope codes (in parentheses), where applicable.
All variables have been winsorised at 1 percent, and computed on a 12-month rolling basis, unless otherwise specified.
Variables Description
Total options Based on data from BoardEx, it represents the total (exercisable and
unexercisable) options outstanding, scaled by total shares outstanding.
Unexercisable options A subset of option holdings, representing options that are unvested
(unexercisable). Actual vesting dates are used to determine the unex-
ercisable state and their respective proportions.
Exercisable options A subset of option holdings, representing options that are vested (ex-
ercisable). Actual vesting dates are used to determine the exercisable
state and their respective proportions.
In-the-money options A subset of option holdings, representing options that are above option
exercise price. Daily share prices are scaled by option strike prices to
determine a weighted average price-to-strike ratio. Options with a ratio
greater than 1 are considered in-the-money.
Out-of-money options A subset of option holdings, representing options that are below option
exercise price. Daily share prices are scaled by option strike prices to
determine a weighted average price-to-strike ratio. Options with a ratio
less than 1 are considered out-of-money.
Treasury dummy Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if repurchase takes place after 1st
December 2003, and 0 for all prior buybacks.
Treasury shares Quarter-lagged ratio of total treasury shares scaled by shares outstand-
ing.
Size Log-normalised value of total firm equity determined daily through the
product of daily closing price (UP) and number of shares outstanding
(NOSH).
Market-to-book Market-to-book ratio measured as market value (book value of debt:
WC02999-WC03501, plus market value of equity: UP * NOSH) scaled
by book value of assets (WC02999) in 2011 terms.
Leverage Net leverage computed as net debt (total liabilities net of cash hold-
ings: WC03251-WC02001) scaled by net assets (total assets net of cash
holdings: WC02999-WC02001).
Cash Cash component computed as cash and cash equivalents (WC02001)
scaled by total assets (WC02999).
Return on assets Return on assets determined as earnings before interest and tax but
after depreciation (WC18198) scaled by total assets (WC02999).
Return volatility Daily computation of a 1-year lagged standard deviation of a security’s
return index (RI), incorporating all distributions.
Average spread Daily computation of average 3-month lagged spread between ask (PA)
and bid price (PB).
Lagged return Log-normalised, 6-month rolling returns of a security’s return index
(RI), incorporating all distributions.
Dividend payout Ratio of total dividends per share paid in a trailing 12-month period
scaled by earnings per share (WC09504).
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